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Negotiating the regime was difficult. Countries disagreed about which pollutants to control. Developed countries wanted to control all sources of pollution, whereas many of the less developed countries (LDCs) saw this as a thinly veiled attempt to control their industrialization practices and thus opted for the control of only municipal and tanker wastes. Algerian President Houari Boumediene, who initially was actively hostile toward environmental protection, announced in the early 1970s, "If improving the environment means less bread for the Algerians, then I am against it."5 The Algerian delegate to the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment also firmly stated that Algeria "will not sacrifice development at the altar of the environment."6 Later, Boumediene continued to "assure [the developed countries] that many of us would be very happy to help you solve your pollution problems by processing [raw materials] in our own countries."7 Algeria blamed France for much of the Algerian coastal pollution but was loath to negotiate with the exploitative North. However, in 1983, Algeria ratified the very treaty against which such bombast had been directed.
Even though the Med Plan was successfully negotiated, its maintenance poses an anomaly in terms of conventional understanding of how regimes operate. The most intriguing puzzle regarding the Med Plan's effectiveness is why states comply, given the fact that so many were initially opposed to it. As Oran Young and Robert Keohane have noted, the most compelling argument for a regime's importance in promoting international order is the fact that compliance is achieved even when the regime's norms and principles run counter to the short-term interests of the participants (or the hegemon).8 The highly technical dimension of the Med Plan makes it a "most expected case" for an explanation that emphasizes consensual scientific knowledge. However, the diversity of political interests in the region and the widespread political antipathy to international environmental protection initially inhibited the easy influence of scientists on their governments.
The Med Plan's successful creation was promoted by a community of ecologists and marine scientists. They served in UNEP's secretariat and were often granted formal decision-making authority in national administrations. In addition to their involvement in the policymaking process, they were given responsibility for enforcing and supervising pollution control measures. The members of this group became partisans for adopting the regime, complying with it, and strengthening it to deal with more pollutants from more sources. Following the involvement of these new actors, state interests came to increasingly reflect their environmental view, as seen in diplomats' statements and government policies, and state behavior came to reflect their interests as well, as was evident from state investment patterns and diplomatic actions. Compliance, as measured by the adoption of new policies which are consonant with the regime's norms and which ease its enforcement, has been strongest in countries in which the experts were able to consolidate their power most firmly.
As the case of the Med Plan shows, regimes may be transformative, leading to the empowerment of new groups of actors who can change state interests and practices. According to the explanation suggested here, if a group with a common perspective is able to acquire and sustain control over a substantive policy domain, the associated regime will become stronger and countries will comply with it. Such groups are most likely to be consulted after a crisis, especially when decision makers are uninformed about the technical dimensions of the problem at hand or are uncertain about the costs and benefits of international cooperation. New national policies, often in compliance with the regime, would then reflect the interests of the group consulted and empowered, and the duration of the new policies would depend upon the group's ability to consolidate and retain its bureaucratic power. The substantive nature of the regime would reflect the group's cause-andeffect beliefs. Because of the usual institutional rigidities and the overall administrative inertia at reviewing past decisions, such power would be likely to persist until a subsequent crisis incited other decision makers to consult with a new group or until the current group was weakened by internal disagreements or as a result of bureaucratic infighting with another group. It would follow logically, then, that the loss of consensus within the group or the loss of the group's access to high-level decision making would lead to a breakdown in compliance.
In The Contracting Parties shall individually or jointly take all appropriate measures in accordance with the provision of this Convention and those protocols in force to which they are party, to prevent, abate and combat pollution of the Mediterranean Sea Area and to protect and enhance the marine environment in that area.11
The rules and decision-making procedures consist of annual intergovernmental meetings at which the secretariat's administration of the joint monitoring projects is reviewed and the Contracting Parties' attempts to develop and enforce national legislation for pollution control are held up to nominal public scrutiny. A weak provision for arbitration exists but has never been invoked.
Until 1976, there was a very loose framework for evaluation. After 1976, the rules became stronger as the parties adopted protocols covering a more comprehensive range of sources and types of pollutants. The rules have grown in scope from banning marine dumping to controlling a wide variety of land-based sources of pollution, including agricultural sprays and industrial and municipal wastes. They also govern pollutants transmitted to the Mediterranean through rivers and the atmosphere. In addition to its early focus on dumping and oil spills, the Med Plan now "eliminates" the emissions of nine groups of toxic substances, "limits" the emissions of thirteen groups of less hazardous substances, and requires states to develop specific guidelines for control of these substances. The specific substances are identified in the technical annexes to the land-based sources protocol. Interim ambient quality-control standards for water in recreational areas and shellfish grounds were adopted in September 1985. An inventory of products containing the regulated substances is to be completed by the mid-1990s, along with specific ambient and emission standards. An additional annex to control pollution transmitted through the atmosphere is due to be completed in 1989. Effective control of oil pollution will require the construction of facilities to receive oily ballast material in most major Mediterranean ports, at a cost of over $150 million.
Following the evolution of a stronger regime, the quality of the Mediterranean has improved. Beaches have been protected from organic wastes, such as municipal garbage. Environmental quality data on inorganic pollu- Although it is extremely difficult to confirm, regional scientists concur that the quality of the Mediterranean is better than it would have been without the Med Plan, and preliminary studies suggest that the pollution level has at least stabilized and is now about the same as it was in the early 1970s. In light of the rapid coastal population growth and industrialization during the past two decades,19 maintaining the Mediterranean at a constant level of pollution is quite an accomplishment. 
International Organization
The ecological epistemic community and the Med Plan The success of the Med Plan is attributable to the involvement of ecologists and marine scientists who set the international agenda and directed their own states toward support of international efforts and toward the introduction of strong pollution control measures at home.
In the Mediterranean in the early 1970s, government leaders became increasingly concerned about the extent of pollution of the Mediterranean Sea. Jacques Cousteau alerted the world to the potential "death" of the sea, but government officials did not know whether such predictions were valid (they turned out not to be), nor did they know the extent of the problem, the sources and types of pollutants, or the means of preventing or controlling pollution. Therefore, they turned to the region's marine scientists for information and to UNEP for the development of environmental policies and the drafting of a treaty to protect the Mediterranean Sea.
UNEP officials, some secretariat members from other specialized agencies (notably WHO and the Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO]), and likeminded governmental officials in the region comprised an "epistemic community."20 Together, they acted as an informally coordinated lobbying group. They also shared a common ecological outlook. In this ecological epistemic community, the members had similar beliefs about the need to preserve the quality of the physical environment and similar views on the origins and severity of pollutants, the policies necessary to control pollution, and the research needed to determine the physical linkages between sources of pollution and the health of the sea by evaluating all economic activities and possible uses of the sea within a broader ecosystemic framework. This epistemic community consisted of high-ranking UNEP officials and mid-level government officials from various countries (including France, Israel, Greece, Egypt, and Yugoslavia) and from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds (such as engineering, physics, oceanography, microbiology, urban planning, 20. The term has been used in the literature on sociology of knowledge and has been adapted for use in international relations to refer to a specific community of experts sharing a belief in a common set of cause-and-effect relationships as well as common values to which policies governing these relationships will be applied. UNEP officials also forged transnational alliances with regional marine scientists, who shared an interest in controlling specific pollutants but lacked the overall holistic, causal framework that ecologists accepted. Effectively acting in harmony with UNEP, these scientists had the combined impact of persuading their governments to support the UNEP measures to control as many sources and types of pollution as possible, to move for stronger measures for their control, and to comply with Med Plan policies. Later, as environmental ministries were established in the Mediterranean countries, these scientists were invited to join their staffs, as were people who were firmly in the epistemic community.
Ecological principles were embraced by members of the epistemic community as their core set of beliefs about cause-and-effect relationships. Ecology as a discipline asserts the unity of narrower scientific disciplines and conceptions of the world:
The holistic viewpoint, as a philosophy of science, is both a confession of faith and a goal to be pursued; and as such it has great significance. In describing nature as one integrated system it reveals the scientists' faith in a universe of cause-and-effect relationships, the whole of which is capable of being made intelligible to the normal mind. At the same time it points to the essential unity of science with respect to its problems and its ultimate goal.21
Coming into popularity following World War II, ecology is fundamentally a framework in which other disciplines may be assimilated:
This new science, which is an integration of the traditional disciplines of geology, oceanography, ecology, meteorology, chemistry, and other sciences, has a variety of names-earth systems science, global change, and biogeochemistry. Its subject is nothing less than the composition, behavior and interactions of the planet's nonliving realms or phasesthe atmosphere, geosphere, and hydrosphere-and its living realm, the biosphere, which encompasses parts of each of the others. appropriate levels and methods of analysis may be integrated within such a broad framework.
By promoting the adoption of a very broad definition of "pollution" which emanated from an ecological perspective, UNEP and members of the ecological epistemic community were able to encompass more parochial interests under its umbrella. The definition reads:
"Pollution" means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment resulting in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities including fishing, impairment of quality for use of sea-water and reduction of amenities.23
Such a broad formulation of concerns blurred the distinctions between otherwise incompatible views, and this enabled UNEP and other members of its epistemic community to tie in with the broadest possible constituency by incorporating the concerns of many groups within those of UNEP. Many of the individual marine scientists and officials of specific organizations had different views about the nature of the problem of Mediterranean pollution and the appropriate remedies, reflecting their various backgrounds and expertise in disciplines such as marine biology, marine chemistry, marine geology, oceanography, microbiology, public health, and civil engineering. For instance, marine biologists and FAO officials were concerned with the positive and negative effects of organic pollutants on fishery yields. These pollutants largely come from municipal wastes. On the other hand, public health officials and WHO representatives, whose focus is on human health and communicable diseases, were concerned with the adverse effects of inorganic industrial wastes as well as the untreated municipal wastes that concerned marine biologists. These perspectives gave rise to mutually exclusive policy proposals, as FAO officials suggested that some organic wastes were useful nutrients for relatively hungry fish in the Mediterranean, whereas public health officials advocated the closure of beaches exposed to such wastes. Within UNEP's broad definition, research and policies could be developed to satisfy each group individually while avoiding a direct confrontation between them. UNEP cemented the alliances by funding scientific research that was not supported by domestic sources, providing sophisticated monitoring equipment and training in its use, and publicizing the research findings. UNEP's discretionary control over the Med Plan budget allowed it to continue to distribute funds among the various members of the alliance during budgetary squeezes from 1979 to 1982. The provision of sophisticated equipment allowed scientists to conduct new studies and generate data revealing the Pressures for compliance generally came from environmental ministries. As shown in Table 1 , these ministries were either coordinative or regulatory. While coordinative ministries were merely responsible for encouraging other governmental bodies to consider environmental factors in their activities, regulatory ministries had direct responsibility for formulating and enforcing environmental policy.
In the early 1970s, most of the countries established coordinative environmental ministries, in keeping with the holistic environmental ethos galvanized by preparations for the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. These ministries were staffed by members of the ecological epistemic community and by the marine scientists who were allied with UNEP, since they were the only ones with a strong reputation for expertise in pollution control. These groups had little affinity with other ministries in their own governments and felt more closely tied to their functional counterparts around the region. As members of UNEP's transnational alliance, they were all involved in the Med Plan negotiations, and they encouraged their own governments to support these negotiations and to comply with Med Plan arrangements.
Epistemic communities 389
With only small staffs, slim budgets, and little statutory authority, the coordinative environmental ministries were seldom able to compel other ministries to control pollution within their functional domains. However, once they were transformed into regulatory ministries, as occurred in seven countries (see Table 1 The ecological epistemic community has been able to use the administrative base provided by environmental ministries to effectively promote its own preferred vision of pollution control, which is broader in scope and more clearly delineated than the vague, formal missions assigned to the ministries in various countries. In this respect, it has been a story of putting the foxes in charge of the chicken coop. For instance, in Israel and Greece, the foreign ministries ceded responsibility for Med Plan negotiations to the Israeli environmental protection service24 and to the Greek national council for physical planning and the environment (NCPPE), respectively, which were both staffed by members of the epistemic community. The NCPPE was instructed by its foreign affairs ministry to be "pro-environment," in essence making the Greek delegation an active environmental lobbyist and giving the scientific constituency within the government a free hand to formulate and pursue policy. With the NCPPE as a springboard, the staff introduced new domestic environmental legislation to Parliament and continually served as an "honest broker" to mediate conflicts at intergovernmental meetings.
In France, ecologists have usually been appointed as major officials of the environmental ministry, although their beliefs have not always been shared by the head of the ministry, whose appointment varies with the administration in power. In Algeria, the members of the environmental ministry and the supporting body of research marine scientists have not been members of the epistemic community, although they have shared its concerns about controlling specific pollutants.
The importance of scientific access to government decision making is underscored by the Italian experience. With a large and experienced sci- In most cases, the environmental ministries' authority over pollution control in Mediterranean countries was not challenged by industrial groups or by commerce ministries. Multinational corporations potentially affected by the Med Plan arrangements were slow to recognize its implications and only weakly entered the process after most of the agreements had been concluded. In 1981, the Centre Europeen des Silicones, representing the European silicon industry, asked UNEP to remove organosilicons from the list of substances for which permits must be obtained from national authorities before they can be emitted into the Mediterranean, but their request was denied. The persistent uncertainty about the actual extent of regional pollution deferred challenges to the authority of the environmental ministries. There was prevailing sentiment that something had to be done, and the ministries were the only groups with anything to offer. Initially established as coordinative ministries, their creation was seldom challenged, since they did not appear to pose a real threat to other administrative bodies. Subsequent administrative reforms turning them into regulatory ministries received less attention, although in many countries, such as Algeria, Greece, and Egypt, true enforcement responsibility is split between the commerce ministry and the environmental ministry.
A more detailed analysis of the process by which Algeria and Egypt came to support the Med Plan indicates the key role played by the epistemic community. At first, both of these countries were strongly opposed to introducing measures that would inhibit industrial growth and were highly suspicious of French motivations. However, following the involvement of the epistemic community, these positions were reversed. This is particularly striking given the fact that, as small countries, both would have been able to free-ride on arrangements once they were supported by France. 394 International Organization concern within the government and among elites. The evidence of increasing marine pollution was finally accepted by the early 1980s, and policies began to change.
The Algerian position also became much more constructive at Med Plan meetings after 1979. Delegates from CROP and the hydrologic ministry began to accompany foreign ministry officials to these meetings. Although foreign ministry officials retained control over decision making, they invited greater policy input from the scientific community, and scientists gained a stronger voice within the government. The CROP scientists did not appear to share UNEP's holistic viewpoint, but they did hope to study and control a broader range of marine pollutants than was currently controlled. Therefore, they urged government officials to adopt more comprehensive policies and to encourage their foreign affairs colleagues at Med Plan meetings to do the same.
The gradual involvement of the epistemic community also transformed Egyptian policy. Scientists were initially isolated from the government, having access only to the Egyptian academy of scientific research and technology. During early Med Plan negotiations, delegates from the foreign ministry focused on encouraging the transfer of technology on concessionary terms, but they did nothing substantive with regard to specific sources or types of pollutants to control. The delegates' attitude toward pollution control was one of ambivalence or even indifference.
However, scientists were consulted in the early 1980s, as the government convened commissions to decide whether Egypt should adopt the protocol for control of land-based sources of pollution and to determine what the domestic effects of ratification would be. Administrative reforms from 1980 to 1982 created a new environmental affairs agency and committees in the academy for scientific research and technology, which were charged with developing environmental policy and determining whether Egypt should ratify the various Med Plan treaties. Chaired and lobbied by individuals who were closely tied to UNEP, the committees not surprisingly advocated immediate compliance with the Med Plan norms, which the foreign ministry accepted. Egypt ratified the protocols to control pollution from land-based sources and to establish specially protected areas.
Already sensitive to the variety of pollution problems facing Egypt, marine scientists who were now invited into the policy arena began to encourage legislation to control the whole gamut of pollutants and sources of pollution. In 1982, the government introduced Egypt's law no. 48 to protect the Nile, followed by a number of ministerial directives aimed at controlling a variety of forms of pollution. In January 1983, President Mubarak announced that water quality control and sewage treatment were primary national concerns and called for an investment of $4.6 billion to develop water resources and control water pollution. The environmental affairs agency has advocated the widespread use of environmental impact assessments, expanded investment in sewerage and sewage treatment, and development of specific emission and ambient standards for coastal waters used for different purposes (recreation, navigation, and so forth). A $1-billion sewage treatment plant in Alexandria is slated for completion by mid-1989, and plans are being made to convert the sludge to fertilizer by 1994. Work is also under way for muchneeded sewerage construction in Cairo. In the early 1980s, the ministry of industry spent $24.6 million on controlling industrial wastes as part of a $153-million industrial production project supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).8
France provides the limiting case for the extent of an epistemic community's influence. Although the epistemic community consolidated its power in the French environmental ministry and was able to redirect domestic planning policy, it was relatively weak in influencing foreign environmental policy because the Quai d'Orsay would not cede authority to it.
Since its creation in 1972, the French environmental ministry has been able to retain and consolidate its power within subsequent administrations. The environmental ministry was less powerful than the foreign affairs ministry, however, and was unable to prevail with regard to French Med Plan positions. Internationally, the foreign affairs ministry had broader geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean to which the Med Plan was subordinated, and it therefore kept the scientists on a tight rein. The Quai d'Orsay supported overall compliance with international environmental law and was willing to defer to the environmental ministry's abiding interest in integrated environmental planning, about which it had no interest; but French delegates from the foreign affairs ministry were reluctant to accept the provisions in the protocol for control of land-based sources of pollution which nomic reliance on phosphate exports; and as a result of thorough documentation submitted by the secretariat, most of the LDCs were convinced of the need to control more industrial heavy metals than were covered under existing international law. The case of France, however, demonstrates the limits of persuasion. With its regional foreign policy prestige at stake, the Quai d'Orsay was only willing to accept policy advice from the French environmental ministry in areas about which the Quai was indifferent.
In the domain of domestic policy, by which the states complied with the Med Plan, learning occurred through bureaucratic preemption of policymaking by the environmental ministries. The epistemic community usurped decision-making authority and promoted pollution control policies consistent with its own perspective. As observed earlier, no learning occurred in countries in which the epistemic community was unable to appropriate control.
Throughout, changes in government policy did not directly follow from objective reports of coastal pollution or from the existence of consensual knowledge. In Algeria, for instance, governmental concern about changes in environmental quality were expressed only after the domestic marine scientists were identified as authoritative experts and had become entrenched in the government. When foreign observers had reported the same phenomena in the early 1970s, the Algerian foreign ministry officials had been deaf to outside advice.39 They had also ignored extensive domestic evidence of coastal pollution from Algerian industry. 40 Learning did not result solely from the persuasive force of shared understanding. Persuasion did account for a small amount of the regime's broadened scope to include more sources and forms of pollution, but national compliance came from the power acquired by a new group of actors. Consensual knowledge is the common bond within this group, but it did not serve as a process of regime change. Instead, it served largely as a power resource for members of the epistemic community. With no basis for challenging their authority, they were able to use consensual knowledge to bolster their policymaking advice. The regime not only provided new evidence but, more important, it also empowered a group that was able to articulate what the evidence portended for Mediterranean governments and to suggest policies to alleviate anticipated problems.
In Compliance did not stem from popular mass politics in the Mediterranean countries either. Domestically, issues of marine quality were not highly politicized, and they remained within the purview of a small group of elites and technocrats in the environmental ministries. Citizen response was generally too weak and too delayed to influence the decision to control marine pollution. Although public acceptance and support of "environmental values," at least in Western Europe, were on the rise,46 such support did not extend to marine issues. Public support for "environmental" issues in France from 1973 to 1975 overwhelmingly focused on the preservation of furry animals and the development of energy resources.47 The Green movement in France, although receiving as much as 3.88 percent of the national vote in 1981 presidential elections, has been organized around issues of distrust of modern technocratic society rather than issues related to marine pollution. 48 Similarly, in Greece, environmental deterioration emerged as a popular issue in 1980, yet this was a response to Athenian air pollution.49 Governmental concern with the environment preceded popular concern by several years. Very few citizens expressed systematic concerns about the Mediterranean, although in the mid-1970s an environmental organization successfully opposed construction of factories in enclosed gulfs, until it went bankrupt in 1982. In Israel, environmental protection appeared on the Knesset's agenda before it appeared in the popular press.50
Nor did compliance stem from the rational anticipation of future benefits or from guarantees that other partners would not ride freely. 51 The Med Plan does provide many of the functional goods that Keohane and Axelrod identify as being absent in international society (such as information about the environment and other actors' choices, a stable forum for interactions that reduce transaction costs, and a set of iterated sequences in which actors may hope to receive reciprocated concessions in the future), but their provision is insufficient to explain the full force of compliance with the regime. For example, the Algerian leaders' initial antipathy to cooperation was so severe that it does not seem credible that they were only grandstanding in order to obtain subsequent concessions. Algeria could have ridden freely in 1980 after observing France's decision to unilaterally enforce pollution control regulations; instead, within two years, Algeria chose to follow the French example. Viewed through "rational choice" lenses, a crude cost-benefit analysis might suggest that defection would have been more profitable than cooperation for Algeria. By avoiding the expenditures related to pollution control, Algerian industry would have gained a comparative advantage that benefited Algeria as a whole, and the state would also have forgone investment expenditures in coastal factories (such as Sonatrech refineries) and municipal sewage treatment facilities. For Algeria and Egypt as well, the costs of controlling pollution may have outweighed the economic benefits of improved coastal water quality (for instance, benefits of increased fishery yields, decreased medical costs, and increased income from tourism) and the marginal benefits of technology transfer and training provided by UNEP. UNEP would most likely have continued to provide this support and support in the functional areas identified by Keohane and Axelrod, even in the absence of constructive Algerian and Egyptian diplomacy and domestic policy changes. Nonetheless, these two countries chose to comply fully with the Med Plan in the sphere of developing more comprehensive national policies (see Table 1 ).
Conclusion
The most notable aspect of the Med Plan is the domestic compliance with it. In the literature on international relations, few studies have focused on the reasons for which states actually comply with regimes. As argued above, coercion, public opinion, and anticipation of benefits do not fully explain the extent of compliance. The Med Plan's success was due to the regime's introduction of new actors who influenced national behavior and contributed to the development of coordinated and convergent policymaking in the Mediterranean states. In the face of uncertainty, a publicly recognized group with an unchallenged claim to understanding the technical nature of the regime's substantive issue-area was able to interpret for traditional decision makers facts or events in new ways and thereby lead to new forms of behavior.52
Common principles and norms gave rise to a common set of rules for pollution control. The principles also empowered new domestic groups of marine scientists, who led their governments to comply more strongly with the regime and to negotiate more constructively internationally. In turn, the regime's scope was broadened and stronger rules were negotiated-rules with which most states have complied. 
